ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will require the development of emissions abatement technologies that are not currently available or that are not currently cost-effective. While market mechanisms, such as carbon pricing, must play a central role in stimulating the development of these technologies, governmental policy aimed at fostering these technologies and lowering their costs must also play a part.
1
Of the many GHG-reducing technologies currently being discussed, this article will focus on carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology as the most salient and most representative GHG emissions abatement technology. CCS technology remains an immature technology; but like many other GHG emissions reductions technologies, holds great potential for reducing emissions while minimizing disruption to existing energy systems. More generally, this article will entertain the possibility that other technologies may emerge to play a prominent role in carbon management, and will refer to these technologies as carbon management technologies (CMTs). CMTs contemplated in this article (most prominently CCS) build on an existing infrastructure associated with upstream energy production, and hence do not require drastic changes in infrastructure or behavior. Government support for CMTs has been provided on a relatively ad hoc basis. This article provides an analysis of the legal ramifications of policies to support CMTs, so as to afford guidance to policymakers and aid in providing a rational, coherent, consistent set of GHG policies. Towards that end, we analyze the international trade and international investment law implications of different policies to support CMTs.
This article surveys policies that support CMTs in Section II, and discusses the international investment law and international trade law implications of such policies. The discussion is broken down into two sections: Section III discusses how international investment law and international trade law may constrain CMT -promoting policies, and Section IV discusses how they may aid them. International investment law or international trade law might constrain CMT-promoting policies if, for example, carbon intensive investors or states could argue that these CMT-promoting policies adversely affect the financial viability of their investments 2 or violate a World Trade Organization (WTO) rule. 3 On the other hand, international investment law and international trade law could promote or reinforce CMT -promoting policies.
4 This could be the
A. Carbon Management Technologies
The CMT most relevant to this article is CCS. CCS reduces C0 2 emissions by capturing them from a point source 7 and injecting the captured C0 2 into a suitable geological formation (depleted oil or gas reservoirs, deep saline aquifers or un-minable coal seams) from which they 5. For reviews that discuss a broader range of policy measures see, e.g., Richard 15-17, 20-22, 191-94 (2011 Harrison eds., 2010) (discussing the fact that direct air capture technology is also being explored and should it become feasible on a large scale, it would not be restricted to point sources but could also provide a mechanism to correct for past emissions and for generalized sources such as the transportation industry). [Vol. 53 will not enter the atmosphere and contribute to climate change. 8 While much of the CCS discussion has centered upon the electricity generation industry, CCS also offers promise for other industrial applications 9 such as the upstream energy production sector that is the focus of this article.
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Research is underway to improve the technology involved in each of the three links in the CCS chain: capture, transport and storage. A few full-scale commercial projects already successfully store C0 2 streams captured from natural gas production in deep saline formations. 10 Others involve the combination of carbon capture and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) processes in order to add a financial incentive for upstream captureY EOR involves C0 2 injection into a depleting field in order to maximize oil production by reducing oil viscosity and improving geological porosityY Since permanent C0 2 storage is not the primary goal in EOR undertakings, they often lack monitoring regimes, but they do provide important insights into techniques for future technological development.13 Some upstream natural gas extraction and hydrogen production processes result in relatively pure streams of C0 2 • This reduces capture costs and makes these processes well-placed to take advantage of CCS technology with significant cost savings. 14 Technologically, CCS in the upstream energy industry is feasible, and future improvements await the 8. See, e.g 10. See, e.g., K Michael et al., Geological storage of C02 in saline aquifers-A review of the experience from existing storage operations, 4 lNT'L J. GREENHOUSE GAs CoNTROL 659, 660 (2010) (discussing projects undertaken in Salah, Algeria (2004); Sleipner, Norway (1996) ; and Snhvit, Norway (2008)).
11. See, e.g., GLOBAL CCS INsTITUTE, THE GLOBAL STATUS OF CCS: 2011 , at 11 (2011 , available at http:// cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/ sites I default/ files I publications /22562/ global-status-ccs-2011.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL CCS lNsTlTUTE] (projects include: Val Verde Natural Gas Plant (1972) , Shute Creek Gas Processing Facility (1986 ), Century Plant (2010 , and Great Plains Synfuels Plant and Weyburn-Midale Project (2000) in the U.S and Canada).
12. See, e.g ., Riley, supra note 8, at 165-68 (C0 2 can also be injected into depleted gas fields (enhanced gas recovery) or into coal or shale beds post-hydrofracing in order to displace additional methane (enhanced coal bed methane recovery and shale gas technology). These technologies offer promising hydrocarbon recovery applications but require additional research before they will significantly contribute to permanent C0 2 storage requirements.).
13. Michael, supra note 10, at 664; GLOBAL CCS INsTITUTE, supra note 11, at 12, 17. 14. CCS INDUSTRY RoADMAP, supra note 9, at 20.
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289 development of additional large-scale projects. 15 For example, in Canada, where oil production has become the fastest-growing source of emissions,l6 CCS projects-such as the recently approved Quest Project in Alberta, which will capture of 1.2 MtC0 2 per yearP-will be vital to the sustainability of Canada's upstream oil industry.
Barriers to implementing CCS in the upstream energy industry are not insurmountable if addressed with appropriate policy instruments. These barriers include cost, 18 long project lead-times for storage site identification/ 9 transportation infrastructure development, 20 a clear legal framework 21 and public engagement. 22 These are barriers that can be addressed with informed government policy.
Other CMTs, both potential and existing, may play an important role in reducing GHGs. Policies promoting these other CMTs, such as government subsidies and technology-based regulations, may also have international trade and investment law implications. Some CMTs arealready well-developed but face other barriers to implementation, and may benefit from policies similar to those promoting.CCS. For example, technologies to capture or avoid the venting, fugitive emission, and flaring of natural gas 23 [Vol. 53 the Global Initiative on Gas Flaring Reduction, seeks to reduce natural gas flaring around the world, particularly in developing countries. 24 The findings of this initiative suggest that the problems with preventing venting, fugitive emission, and flaring of natural gas are mostly institutional and regulatory, not technological. 25 Promoting such mature but policy-poor CMTs with appropriate incentives is thus also an important objective of this analysis.
B. Measures Promoting Carbon Management Technologies
Governments face a number of policy choices when determining the most effective way to promote technology development and diffusion. In addition to cost-effectiveness, governments are sometimes constrained by administrative capacity and political feasibility in designing policy. Five feasible and realistic policies to promote CMTs in the upstream energy industry are briefly introduced to form a framework for discussion. These policies are: (1) subsidies; (2) regulations; (3) removal of trade barriers; (4) developing infrastructure and administrative capacity; and (5) carbon pricing.
Subsidies
Subsidies for capital investments, research and development funding, pilot project grants, capacity building grants, tax exemptions, and free emissions allowances under a cap-and-trade scheme may promote the diffusion of target technologies. Financial support for pilot CCS projects and for capacity building research have been prominent parts of climate policy for over a decade. 0016937103, recitals 5, 7, 8, 13, art. 3 (Feb. 23, 2012) form of an explicit price, set by a carbon tax, or may take the form of a market price in a cap-and-trade system of tradable allowances to emit. In either case, emitting GHGs would become costly. Carbon pricing is in effect in the European Union in the form of its European Union Emissions Trading System, and carbon taxation is in effect in various forms in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the UK, Australia, and the Canadian province of British Columbia.
44
Carbon pricing is considered a central element of any effort to make CCS cost-effective. 45 CCS has no purpose whatsoever if emitting GHGs bears no financial consequences. Financing CCS investments thus requires a payback stream in the form of savings from avoiding a carbon tax by avoiding emissions. That said, this article will not discuss in depth the general subject of carbon pricing and the economic, political, and social aspects of carbon pricing, which is extensively treated elsewhere.
46
This article will only make a brief point about trade law and carbon pricing to illustrate an interaction between CMTs and international trade law.
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW· THAT MAY CONSTRAIN POLICIES TO PROMOTE CARBON MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
International investment law and international trade law are commonly thought to pose constraints on environmental policies, and this is no less true of climate policies. Expansive interpretations of the standards of protection afforded foreign investors in international investment law, as well as various uncertainties regarding the interpretation of international trade agreements, may have a constraining effect on governments implementing CMT -promoting policies. The following section considers potential constraints on CMT -promoting policies such as those described in Section II above. 
A. International Investment Law and the Regulatory "Chill"
International investment law designed to protect investments may "chill" governments from promulgating regulations that threaten those investments, 47 which might include CMT-promoting policies. For example, a regulation requiring existing coal-fired power plants to install CCS may be deemed to be a violation of international investment law if it imposes too high of a cost on the foreign investors of the plant. Many of the aspirational goals outlined in international investment agreementsincluding bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 48 -highlight the role of international investment in achieving objectives such as the effective utilization of economic resources, improving living standards, and the protection of the environment. 49 But the primary orientation of international investment law is to protect foreign investors and their investments from confiscatory regulation. This orientation may have a 47. This phenomenon-termed "regulatory dilll"-has been the subject of many studies which have articulated concerns that liAs, including BITs and multilateral agreements such as NAFTA, constrain government efforts to pursue a number of legitimate policy objectives, including: (i) the protection of health and the environment, (ii) the preservation of natural resources (such as fresh water), (iii) climate change mitigation, (iv) the promotion of economic development, (v) the regulation of utilities and delivery of government services, (vi) zoning decisions, (vii) reforming health care, and (viii) regulating the financial sector. See, e.g., HowARD 51 have triggered concern about the policy space afforded to governments to develop and regulate their economies while protecting their environment. 5 2 Expansive interpretations of investment treaty protections may be troubling because they encourage foreign investors to initiate international litigation against governments and expose them to the risk of costly awards.
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Thus, to the extent that governments see the expansion of investor rights under liAs as a risk, they will likely be all the more cautious about implementing environmental policies that promote CMTs.
The sorts of CMT policies that are most likely to be challenged are those that affect incumbents. For example, an emissions standard that an existing facility can only meet by shutting down or retrofitting for CCS may trigger a challenge on basis of alleged expropriation (or a measure www.oecd.org/ daf/inv /intemationalinvestmentagreements/33776498.pdf (reviewing the broad range of views relating to the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, defining "fair and equitable treatment as " [t] he obligation to provide 'fair and equitable treatment' is often stated, together with other standards, as part of the protection due to foreign direct investment by host countries. It is an "absolute", "non-contingent" standard of treatment, i.e. a standard that states the treatment to be accorded in tenns whose exact meaning has to be determined, by reference to specific circumstances of application, as opposed to the "relative" standards embodied in "national treatment" and "most favoured nation" principles which define the required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investment." Id. at 2). tantamount to expropriation), a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, or the national treatment standard. While much will depend on the facts (is the plant fully amortized, were there any specific undertakings made in relation to emissions levels, are incumbents who are foreign investors differentially treated?) the thrust of the civil society critique of liAs is that the mere threat of a challenge may cause governments to scale back their ambition in dealing with carbon incumbents.
In some cases governments have taken measures to reduce the risk of overly broad interpretations of investment disciplines. For example, governments can use more precise language in new agreements 54 or include explicit language that allows governments to justify what might otherwise be characterized as a breach by reference to broad social and environmentaJ objectives. 55 However, both of these measures speak to the future and new treaty relations rather than existing treaty relations. For existing treaty relations, it is possible that the parties may provide authoritative interpretive guidance as to the terms of the treaty.
56
B. International Trade Law and Constraints on Subsidies for Carbon Management Technologies
Governments have provided financial support for pilot CCS projects and funded research aimed at capacity building as a way to pro-54. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 49, at 40-41 (contains interpretive annexes designed to confirm the shared understanding of the parties as to the scope of indirect expropriation and the customary law rules relating to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens).
55. See, e.g., Norway Draft Model BIT, footnote to art. 3, 2007 , available at http://www. italaw.com/sites/defaulf/files/archive/ita103l.pdf (dealing with the national treatment standard and stipulating that: "The Parties agree/[ ]are of the understanding that a measure applied by a government in pursuance of legitimate policy objectives of public interest such as the protection of public health, safety and the environment, although having a different effect on an investment or investor of another Party, is not inconsistent with national treatment and most favoured nation treatment when justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned investment.").
56. The best known example of this approach is the interpretive note issued by the three NAFTA parties in relation to the fair and equitable treatment standard in NAFTA (ASCM) . 58 At one time, the ASCM contained provisions defining and exempting non-actionable subsidies, including those pertaining to research, development, and the costs of environmental regulation. 59 These provisions expired in 1999, however, and are now unenforceable. 60 There is thus limited scope for justifying subsidization measures aimed at mitigating climate change, including CMT -promoting policies. That said, there is some scope for governments to dispute the applicability of the ASCM to their subsidization measures based on definitional arguments. A discussion of a few possibilities follows.
Provision of Goods and Services in the Form of General Infrastructure
Article 1 of the ASCM provides that a subsidy exists if there is a "financial contribution by a government or any public body ... whereby a benefit is conferred." 61 A financial contribution may include: (1) a direct transfer of funds, (2) a situation where a government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone or not collected, and (3) a situation where a government provides goods or services. . .or purchases goods. If a government attempts to make any of the above contributions through a private entity, states can still challenge such contributions under the ASCM.
62 A CMT -promoting policy could run afoul of Article 1 of the ASCM if it is deemed to contribute goods or services in a way that introduces an unfair advantage for a CMT or a domestic entity, vis-a-vis a foreign competitor. For example, promoting CCS by requiring it of power plants is a legitimate stand-alone policy, but subsidizing by directly supplying inputs to domestic CCS contractors would violate Article 1.
However, if a government provides goods or services in the form of general infrastructure, those financial contributions are not considered subsidies as defined under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), making the ASCM inap- 64 The US challenged infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants to Airbus under Articles 1.1 and 2 of the ASCM. The measures at issue included the provision of: (i) industrial sites; (2) access roads; (iii) lengthened runways; and (iv) grants for the expansion and modernization of facilities in various locations throughout the EC. 65 In response, the EC argued that all these measures constituted "general infrastructure" within the meaning of Article l.l(a)(l)(iii) and were therefore not subsidies challengeable under the ASCM. contended that 'universal use' should be the determining factor when deciding whether a government has provided goods or services in the form of general infrastructure. In the U.S. view, the mere fact that a government creates infrastructure for reasons of public policy, to foster economic development, or to perform a public task should not result in the categorization of that infrastructure being 'general'. Id. at 'l[7.1015. Similar arguments were made by third parties to the dispute including Australia (Id. at 'l['l[7.1021 -7.1022 re-characterized the nature of the measures at issue as not relating specifically to infrastructure resulting in no need to make a determination as to the application of Article l.l(a)(1)(iii). As a result, guidance can still be gleaned from the Panel's decision interpreting "general infrastructure" under that provision of the ASCM). [Vol. 53 strate that the infrastructure was or was not provided to or for the use of only a single entity or a limited group of entities.'o6 8 According to the Panel, reviewing bodies may examine any number of factors, including: (i) the circumstances surrounding the creation of the infrastructure in question, (ii) consideration of the type of infrastructure, (iii) the conditions and circumstances of the provision of the infrastructure, (iv) the recipients or beneficiaries of the infrastructure, and (v) the legal regime applicable to such infrastructure, including the terms and conditions of access to and/ or limitations on use of the infrastructure. 69 In this case, the Panel determined that providing access roads was the only measure that constituted permissible financial contributions in accordance with Article l.l(a)(l)(iii) of the ASCM.
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How would a government-supported CCS project fare under this analysis? Based on the test set out above, it seems unlikely that the definitional gap in the ASCM will provide governments with much scope to dispute the applicability of that trade agreement to their CCS subsidies. One interesting question might be whether government grants of pore space to CCS projects would fall within the definition of a subsidy or whether such support would be deemed permissible in accordance with Article l.l(a)(l)(iii) of the ASCM. For example, if a CCS project were designed and operated on the basis of a "utility" model whereby access to the corresponding pore space and infrastructure was available to all owners of C0 2 , then ASCM Article l.l(a)(l)(iii) would render such a project permissable. If, on the other hand, a CCS project were designed and operated with exclusive access rights, then Article l.l(a)(l)(iii) of the ASCM may be less likely to apply.
Actionable Subsidies
Measures that fall within the definition of a "financial contribution" must still confer a benefit in order to be deemed a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the ASCM. The subsidy must then be "specific" to certain enterprises or industries.
71 Once a measure has been found to be "specific" under ASCM, it is necessary to determine whether that measure causes "adverse effects" to the interests of one WTO member. 72 If those preconditions are satisfied, the subsidy will be "actionable. ' "prohibited" under the ASCM.7 3 In those cases, WTO law assumes that damage has been done to other economies. As a result, proof of specificity and an "adverse effect" are not required.
a. Specificity
In some cases, establishing specificity will be relatively easy; the granting authority or legislation will expressly limit a subsidy's access to certain enterprises. Other cases will be far less clear. Under Article 2.l(b) of the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement, specificity will not be established if eligibility of the subsidy is contingent on "criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favor certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of enterprises." 74 The Uruguay Round Agreement is an agreement made by the WTO. Some scholars have suggested that this provision could provide governments with some policy space to pursue renewable energy goals. 75 Still others have observed that governments designing subsidies in accordance with the criteria outlined in Article 2.1(b) may still encounter problems under the ASCM.7
6 Given the prominence of the de facto analysis of specificity, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the test of specificity would not be met. Indeed, it appears that the specificity analysis under Article 2 of the ASCM inevitably has a constraining effect on states trying to support 73 (2011) (suggesting an energy saving subsidy or subsidies for consumers of renewable energy as examples of subsidies that could meet the requirements of Article 2.1(b)).
76. Professor Rubini notes that despite strict compliance with Article 2.1(b), governments still face policy, and legal, based hurdles when implementing renewable energy subsidies. Specifically, Professor Rubini notes that a subsidy in compliance with Article 2.1(b) may still be found to be specific under Article 2.1(c) if there is evidence that the subsidy de facto benefits certain enterprises or industries. In assessing whether a subsidy is de facto specific under Article 2.1(c), WTO case law offers little guidance for governments designing their subsidy programs. While something less than universal eligibility can lead to a finding of non-specificity, a large number of enterprises or industries affected by a subsidy will not necessarily establish that it has general application. (iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another member. Factors to consider when examining whether a WTO member has suffered serious prejudice as a result of a subsidy are further articulated in Article 6 of the ASCM.
78 Subsidies may cause harm in a variety of ways, creating a need for very fact-specific examinations of harm. Such case-by-case considerations suggest some flexibility within the ASCM and perhaps provide governments with scope to support environmental objectives, like promoting CMTs. For example, it seems possible that a subsidy implemented to promote CMTs like a consumption subsidy or energy-saving subsidy, which does not discriminate with respect to the origin of the energy or technology, may survive the adverse effects analysis. Still, a government's desire to maneuver within this limited and uncertain space will undoubtedly be determined by its willingness to assume the legal risks of possible WTO litigation. 78. Article 6 of the ASCM provides in part: "Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member from a third country market; (c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; (d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity 17 as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.
ASCM, supra note 58, at arts. 6.3.
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C. International Trade Law and Constraints on Regulations That Promote Carbon Management Technologies 303
One option for addressing climate change available to governments is to impose mandatory emission or energy efficiency standards on a product or production process. Regulations usually outline specific GHG emission or energy efficiency levels or require the use of particular technology, such as CCS. 79 One such regulation that has garnered particular attention over the past year is the proposed European Fuel Quality Directive (EFQD).
80
The proposed EFQD is one of the ways in which Europe hopes to meet its commitment to a 20 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2020.
81 Specifically, the EFQD will require suppliers of transport fuels to reduce the life cycle GHG intensity of their products by six percent by 2020, relative to 2010 carbon emissions levels.
82 To help achieve this goal, the .EFQD differentiates among transportation fuels based on the physical properties of the feedstock from which they are produced. For example, fuels produced from shale oil and fuels produced from bitumen (i.e. unconventional feedstocks) are distinguished from fuels derived from conventional oil. A proposed implementation measure of the EFQD would allocate default GHG emission values to transportation fuels based on the life cycle GHG intensity of each fuel's feedstock source or category. 83 Those default values would then be used to determine whether European transport fuel suppliers have met the EFQD's six percent carbon emissions reduction target. 
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NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53 While the proposed EFQD could effectively reduce GHG emissions84 (and encourage the use of CMTs), the proposed regulation has not received unanimous support. The Government of Canada, which produces oil from its Albertan "oil sands" in a relatively carbon-intense process, took issue with distinctions made between unconventional and conventional fuel sources under the EFQD. 85 Canada has argued that by assigning Canadian oil sands crude a GHG intensity value that is higher than that of other heavy crudes, the EFQD effectively precludes oil sands crude and any associated products from being sold on the EU market.
86
Using the EFQD as backdrop, the following discussion considers the elements that constrain government policy space in the national treatment and necessity provisions 9f the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT). 87 Before delving into that discussion, however, it is necessary to make a preliminary observation about the national treatment disciplines in the TBT and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 88 There are significant overlaps between the national treatment provisions of the TBT Agreement and GATT Article III:4, leading to questions about the relationship between GATT and the TBT Agreement.89 WTO jurisprudence has done little to clarify that relationship. tent with the TBT Agreement. 91 Accordingly, it seems likely that if a measure is challenged under both agreements, claims under the TBT Agreement will be considered before claims made under GATT. As a result, the following discussion centers on the TBT Agreement and posits that, while the TBT Agreement recognizes that governments have the right to implement regulatory measures like the EFQD, 92 there remains a significant degree of uncertainty regarding the validity of each specific measure and hence a corresponding risk that such measure could be successfully challenged under the TBT Agreement.
National Treatment
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires technical regulations to treat imported products no less favorably than like domestic products.
93
There are three elements that must be established in order to find a violation of this provision, namely: (i) that the measure at issue constitutes a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1, (ii) that the imported products are "like" the domestic product and the products of other origin, and (iii) that the treatment accorded to imported products is less favorable than that accorded to like domestic products and like products from other countries.
a. Defining a Technical Regulation
The Appellate Body has outlined three characteristics that define whether a measure will be considered a "technical regulation." Specifically, the measure at issue must: (i) apply to an identifiable product or group of products either explicitly or implicitly, (ii) teristics, including the definable features, qualities, attributes or other distinguishing marks of a product or group of products, and (iii) require mandatory compliance with the product characteristics. 95 Given this broad interpretation, most of a government's regulatory measures mandating emission or energy efficiency characteristics of a product, such as the EFQD, will likely fall under the TBT Agreement. · b. Likeness Once a measure is considered under Annex lA to be a "technical regulation" Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement links a state's national treatment obligation to the concept of "likeness". Specifically, Article 2.1 provides that a government's non-discrimination obligation only relates to "like" products. While GATT jurisprudence has considered the concept of "likeness/o<~6 the interpretive analysis to be used under the TBT has only recently been clarified, with the WTO Panel in US-Tuna II adopting the test for likeness that is used in GATT Article 111:4. 97 As a result, the likeness of products will be informed by: (i) the product's physical properties, (ii) product's end-uses, (iii) consumers' tastes and habits in relation to the products, and (iv) the international tariff classification.98 The analysis of likeness under Article 2.1 will focus on whether there is a competitive relationship between imported and domestic products. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 307
That emphasis on competition as a fundamental quality of likeness has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it places unnecessary constraints on a government's policy space. The test for "likeness" under Article III:4 ignores the economic theory of regulation, which suggests that governments tend to implement regulations when consumers do not differentiate between goods that the government considers distinguishable.100 It might be possible to argue that such concerns were addressed in EC-Asbestos, where the Appellate Body took health risks into account when considering the "likeness" of certain goods. 101 However, where such arguments can be made (e.g. that products are not like because the attributes of one product are associated with health or environmental risks while the other good's attributes do not have similar consequences), evidence of consumer tastes and habits is still relevant to determinations of "likeness."
102 Consequently, products may still be considered "like" if they pose different health or environmental risks and there is evidence that consumers do not consider those factors relevant when behaving in the market. 103
In the case of the EFQD, a likeness analysis would undoubtedly be complicated and based on a number of factors, including: (i) the fuels being compared, including the physical properties of the corresponding feedstocks, (ii) the fuel's end-uses, (iii) market evidence (if any) of consumer tastes and habits regarding different types of fuel, and (iv) the tariff classifications given to the fuels being compared. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a complete likeness analysis, other than to note that the EU would want any likeness analysis to compare fuels that are more easily distinguishable in terms of their GHG emissions intensity, density and viscosity. For example, the EU may be more comfortable with a likeness analysis that compares bitumen with conventional crude oil as such a comparison is more likely to support the distinctions it has made between fuels in the EFQD and its implementing measure. In contrast, should Canada challenge a measure like the EFQD, it will want 100. See, e.g 101. EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 92, at 11 113-26, 130, 145-47 (where the AB determined that asbestos (chrysotile) fibres were not "like" PCG (plyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass) fibres and that cement products containing those fibres were not like).
102. ld. at 11113-26.
103. The recent US-Tuna II WTO decisions arguably go further than this by finding that distinctions made in regulations about the labeling of tuna products based on different fishing methods (some more harmful to dolphins than others) used to catch tuna had no bearing on the "likeness" of tuna products, despite an established consumer preference for products with the 'dolphin-safe' label, see US-Tuna II AB Report, supra note 91, at 1233.
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NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53 to argue for a likeness analysis that compares fuels that are more similar (i.e. heavy crude and bitumen) to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the differentiations made between fuels under the EFQD. It is uncertain, however, which approach a WTO dispute settlement body would take in examining the likeness of fuels for the purpose of determining whether the EFQD complies with international trade law. It is this uncertainty that may have a constraining effect on a government's ability to implement policies like the EFQD, which promote the use of CMTs. As observed above in the context of subsidization for CMTs, a government's willingness to operate within the ambiguities of this aspect of the TBT Agreement will undoubtedly relate, in part, to its willingness take on the risks associated with those uncertainties (i.e. litigation challenging their regulation at the WTO).
c. No Less Favorable Treatment If domestic and imported products are found to be "like," a WTO Panel or Appellate Body will consider whether the imported product is accorded treatment "no less favorable" than the domestic product.
104
Similar to the analysis of non-discrimination seen in GATT Article III:4, formal regulatory distinctions or differences in treatment between imported and domestic goods are not enough to violate TBT Article 2.1. Rather, the analysis centers on whether: (i) a government's measure adversely modifies the conditions of competition for imported products vis-a-vis domestic goods, and (ii) the detrimental impact of that measure reflects discrimination.
105 Thus, determinations of whether there is "less favorable treatment" under TBT Article 2.1 are undoubtedly fact-specific with WTO dispute settlement bodies considering the scope and structure of a government's regulatory measure to determine if the distinctions made between imported and domestic goods adversely impact imports. What remains unclear, however, is whether a violation of the "less favorable treatment" standard will be found only in cases where there is evidence of a government's protectionist intent or whether violations will be found regardless of a government's legitimate intentions, such as protecting the environment.
As is true of the adverse effects analysis under the ASCM Agreement, such case-by-case considerations can evince a certain amount of flexibility under the TBT Agreement for governments to pursue their environmental policy goals through regulations like the EFQD. Indeed, such an examination may also be beneficial in rooting out hidden protec- 106 On the other hand, a government's desire to manoeuver within this uncertain space will undoubtedly be informed by its willingness to entertain the legal risks that a WTO body would question the legitimacy of their regulatory goals.
107 Current WTO jurisprudence considering Article 2.1 appears to support the proposition that the "less favorable treatment test" may have a more constraining effect on the choices available to governments when implementing regulatory measures for environmental purposes. In the recently decided US-Tuna II, US regulations regarding dolphin-safe labeling were found to discriminate against Mexican Tuna despite the fact that one of the objectives pursued by the US measure was the protection of dolphins.
108 That finding in USTuna II suggests that even finding that one of the goals of the EFDQ is to reduce GHG emission would not be sufficient to overcome the less favorable treatment test under TBT Article 2.1.
Necessity
In addition to Article 2.1, measures must also be consistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which authorizes WTO members to implement technical regulations so long as they are ''not ... more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective," with the protection of the environment expressly recognized as a legitimate objective.109 While WTO members are able to set their own level of protection, 110 the analysis under this provision involves the balancing of a number of considerations, including: (i) the contribution made by the measure at issue to a government's legitimate objective, (ii) the traderestrictiveness of the measure at issue, and (iii) the importance of the 107. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 100, at 855 (where, in the context of GATT Article III:4, the authors note that the "so as to afford protection" analysis inevitably means that WTO dispute settlement bodies must carry out, either explicitly or implicitly, a discretionary balancing between trade and other objectives); see also Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 'Aims and Effects' Test, 32lNT'L LAw. 619, 634 (1998) (where the author notes that WTO Panels will not explicitly engage in a balancing between trade and other objectives, like the environment. Instead, such analyses will be hidden with the result that the degree of deference given to government regulators is left to a largely non-transparent exercise of discretion by WTO decision-makers). [Vol. 53 objective and the gravity of consequences from failing to meet the objective.
US-Tuna II
111
The type of evidence a state will need to show it relied upon to make certain regulatory decisions is central to this balancing test. Unlike the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement), which requires a scientific basis for government measures intended to protect human, plant or animal health, 112 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement indicates that when assessing risks, relevant considerations include available "scientific and technical information." Admittedly less onerous than the requirement for scientific evidence under the SPS Agreement, 113 the standard of proof that a WTO Panel or Appellate Body will impose upon governments wanting to promote CMTs will be key to determining the validity of measures under the TBT Agreement. If the need for scientific evidence under the TBT is rigorously required by WTO dispute settlement bodies, states will have less policy space to implement environmental measures aimed at combating climate change. If, on the other hand, a less onerous approach is accepted regarding the need for scientific evidence as a basis for a government's regulatory decisions, then it seems clear that there will be more policy space for states to implement environmental measures for the purpose of climate change mitigation.
114
As with many analyses in international trade law, determining whether measures like the EFQD would survive a challenge under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement depends on how a WTO panel or the Appellate Body assesses a number of factors. In challenging the EFQD, Canada, for example, is likely to present scientific evidence questioning the GHG intensity values assigned to unconventional and conventional fuel sources under the EFQD. Additionally, Canada may tender scientific evidence that questions whether a measure aimed at GHG emissions from different transportation fuels is even able to meaningfully contribute to the mitigation of climate change. tenuous scientific evidence, Canada will argue that the EFQD is too trade-restrictive because it effectively bans unconventional fuels from the EU market. In support of its measure, the EU is likely to argue that the EFQD contributes to the reduction of GHG emissions and thereby fulfills a legitimate environmental objective-climate change mitigation. In support of this contention, Europe will point to scientific evidence that speaks to the existence of climate change as a global challenge and the consequences that will arise if governments do not implement measures to address this problem.U 5 As part of this discussion, the EU would likely tender evidence supporting the distinctions made between different transport fuels under the EFQD. Thus, the EU would further argue that its measure is an appropriate step toward climate change mitigation without being unduly trade restrictive. How a WTO dispute settlement body will weigh all of these arguments, however, remains uncertain. As noted above, this uncertainty may have a constraining effect on a government's ability to implement policies like the EFQD. The greater the latitude a government exercises in regulating, the greater the risk that such regulations will be challenged under the TBT Agreement.
Justifying Measures that Promote Carbon Management Technologies
Despite constraints on CMT -promoting policies, a government may be able to implement its policies by invoking provisions that justify them within WTO law. The most obvious example is Article XX of the GATTY 6 Article XX explicitly recognizes that trade concerns will not always take priority over other legitimate public policy objectives like protecting the environment. 117 In so doing, Article XX gives practical meaning to the aspirations of the WTO, which make reference to the international trade law regime as a means by which countries may promote the sustainable development of world resources and protect the environment.
118 Whether Article XX can be used as a mechanism for the promotion of such goals in relation to measures falling under WTO agreements other than GAIT is a heavily debated proposition. Mar. 20, 1996) GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g) respectively. Thus, in contrast to earlier jurisprudence which tended to focus on the trade implications of a measure without regard to its environmental objectives, the current case law examining Articles XX(b) and XX(g) strikes more of a balance between the goals of trade liberalization and environmental protection. As a result, it seems possible that a measure focused on the promotion of CMTs could be provisionally justified under either (or both) Articles XX(b) and XX(g). The crucial language in Articles XX(b) and XX(g) are ''necessary to" and "relating to." The analysis under XX(b) is stricter than that the analysis under XX(g). For a time, ''necessity" under Article XX(b) was stringently interpreted. WTO panels found that measures could only be justified under this provision if they were the least trade restrictive measures reasonably available to a state. 130 More recently, the Appellate Body expanded on this analysis and determined that the current test for ''necessity" promotes the weighing and balancing of a number of factors, 125. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 128. See US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 120, at 8. 129. WTO jurisprudence indicates these two provisions are distinct. In order for a WTO member to justify policies which promote CMTs under Article XX(b) it will need to provide evidence that the measure contributes to the protection of human, animal or plant life or health specifically; arguments that a measure contributes to broad environmental protection objectives will not be considered compelling under XX(b including: (i) the contribution made by the (non-indispensable) measure to a government's legitimate objective; (ii) the importance of the common interests or values protected; and (iii) the impact of the measure on trade.
131 While the analysis under Article XX(g) and its "relatedness" requirement is less stringent than "necessity" under Article XX(b), a government justifying its measures under Article XX(g) will still need to demonstrate a "close and genuine relationship of ends and means" which is not "disproportionately wide in its scope and reach".
132 Additionally, so long as the measure is even handed in relation to domestic measures, the 'effective in conjunction' requirement should be met. 133 c. Article XX Chapeau A measure that can be provisionally justified under one of Article XX's subparagraphs must still be considered under the Article XX chapeau. The chapeau, an important introductory clause to Article XX, 134 prevents states from abusing the Article XX exceptions, and some consider the chapeau "the most important provision in [GATT] ."
135 Under the chapeau a measure must not be applied "in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" and must not be "a disguised restriction on trade."
136
In contrast to the analysis that takes place under Article XX's subparagraphs, an examination of measures aimed at the promotion of CMTs under the chapeau focuses on the measures' "detailed operating provisions" and "how [they are] actually applied."
137 As a result, the chapeau requires a WTO member to provide evidence justifying any differential treatment of, and/or among, its trading partners.
138
Here it is important to note that "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" as contemplated by the chapeau is analytically distinct from discrimination under the Most Favored Nation and National Treatment provisions of GATT. 139 In contrast to GATT Articles I and III, which require that a WTO member's measure have a uniform effect on all trading partners, an analysis of unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination under the chapeau necessarily requires consideration of a measure's diverse effects on "countries where the same conditions prevail." As a result, measures promoting the use of CMTs will have a greater chance of surviving justification under the chapeau if they fairly and predictably make adjustments for countries with comparable climate policies and for countries at different stages of economic development. 140 Whether a WTO member has taken into account the special needs of its trading partners and can thereby justify such a measure under the chapeau will depend on whether: (1) its measure requires a foreign country to adopt its own policies; (2) it has attempted to engage in negotiations with its trading partners with a view to concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements; and (3) the implementation and administration of its measure respects basic fairness and due process.
141
To date, chapeau justifications have not been very successfui.l 42 For example, in US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body did not accept that a uniform pollutant baseline for importers and an individualized pollutant baseline for domestic refiners was justifiable on the grounds that administrative difficulty and domestic hardship required the differing treatment of domestic and foreign industry. Similarly, in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that a requirement permitting the marketing of shrimp only if caught by a vessel equipped with a Turtle Excluder Device could not overcome the Article XX Chapeau for a number of reasons including: (i) differing technology phase-in periods, (ii) the rigidity and infleXIbility of the measure which recognized only one way of avoiding turtle harm, (iii) and the lack of a transparent and predictable certification process under the measure. 143 More recently, in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body determined that while a Brazilian regulation banning the import of retreaded tires was necessary for the "reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation" 144 it was arbitrary and unjustified 139. See PAUWELYN, supra note 124, at 37-38 (offers an incisive explanation of the differences between discrimination in the chapeau and GATT Articles I (Most-Favoured-Nation) and III (National Treatment) 
